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I. INTRODUCTION

During the latter half of the twentieth century, society's perception of juvenile delinquents changed dramatically.' Once fairly
1. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court - Part 11. Race and the
"Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 327 (1999) (noting that "[t]he public...
perceive[s] a significant and frightening increase in youth crime and violence'); see also S. REP.
No. 93-1011, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5285 (describing the mid-century
increase in juvenile arrests for violent crimes, including murder, rape, and robbery).
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characterized as "immature kids who might get arrested for truancy,
shoplifting or joy riding," juvenile offenders have recently earned
reputations as vicious criminals regularly committing such serious
offenses as robbery, rape, and murder.' This apparent trend toward
increased violence has resulted in a "get tough" approach to federal
juvenile justice policies.' Accordingly, Congress has expanded the
federal government's ability to prosecute certain juvenile offenders by
broadening the scope of federal jurisdiction.4
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, for example,
authorizes federal prosecution of juveniles for certain violent crimes
and serious drug offenses.5 Most of these juvenile offenders had previously fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of state authorities." The
Crime Control Act, however, permits federal prosecution whenever the
Attorney General issues a certification that the case holds "a substantial [f]ederal interest."7 This gateway provision enables federal prosecutors to deny juvenile offenders participation in state juvenile justice
systems. The certification option thus gives federal officials the power
to strip federal juvenile offenders of the potential benefits of participating in the states' comprehensive systems of rehabilitative programs.8

2.
SUSAN GUARINO-GHEZZI & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING JUVENILE JUSTICE vii
(1996) (quoting Review & Outlook. Bad Boys, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1993, at A18, available in
1993 WL-WSJ 677809).
3.
See Feld, supranote 1, at 327.
4. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1320-21 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
5.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-473, § 1201, 98 Stat. 1976,
2149-50. Before these amendments, federal jurisdiction turned only on the state's ability or
desire to rehabilitate the juvenile offender. See Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1320.
6.
See discussion infra Part IV (regarding JJDPA's presumption of state jurisdiction).
7.
18 U.S.C. § 5032; see also United States v. Juvenile KIJ.C., 976 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-23
(N.D. Iowa 1997). This certification authority has been delegated to the Deputy Assistant
Attorneys General and the United States Attorneys. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.57 (1999).
8.
State juvenile justice systems generally offer unique benefits and advantages for juvenile offenders. These benefits include an appearance before a state court judge specializing in
juvenile cases rather than a federal district court judge unfamiliar with the special needs of
juveniles. See Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform
Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 754-55 (finding "juvenile
court judges are far more experienced in juvenile justice and [possess] a greater understanding of
the unique developmental and mental needs and deficits of juveniles" than judges who normally
handle adult offenders); see also Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting
that "the federal system [has] no separate juvenile courts). These judges have access to a wide
array of state rehabilitation programs with which they are familiar, including, for example, boot
camps, drug rehabilitation programs, group home environments, wilderness programs, job
training and other educational programs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5667f (1994) (boot camps); DEAN
CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 482-83,
486-95 (2d ed. 1998) (group homes, wilderness programs, and educational programs); Julianne P.
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Despite the potentially serious consequences for juveniles,
many circuit courts of appeals have held that the substantive aspects
of certification decisions remain within the discretion of the Attorney
General and are therefore judicially unreviewable.9 A few circuits,
however, allow varying degrees of judicial review over federal prosecu0 This Note considtors' substantive decisions regarding certification."
ers the merits of these decisions and proposes an alternative analysis
emphasizing the necessity of judicial review. Part II discusses the
historical development of the federal government's relationship with
the juvenile justice system, a relationship culminating in the presumption in favor of state jurisdiction established in the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.11 Part III analyzes the various circuit court decisions addressing whether the judiciary should
review the Attorney General's certification that certain juvenile cases
meet the criteria necessary to overcome this presumption. Part IV
discusses juveniles' statutory interest in participating in state juvenile
justice systems, an interest given inadequate consideration by the
circuit courts. Finally, Part V addresses the due process issues arising
in this context and concludes that the Constitution requires judicial
review of Attorney General certification decisions that result in federal prosecution of certain juvenile offenders.

II. THE FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Before the advent of a separate juvenile justice system a century ago, children committing criminal offenses faced the same procedures and punishments as adult criminals." During this period, the

Sheffer, Note, ReconcilingPunishmentand Rehabilitationwithin the Juvenile JusticeSystem, 48
VAND. L. REV. 479, 499 n.100, 506 (1995) (noting specialized programs in Ohio including job
training and substance abuse counseling and generally referring to the importance of such state
programs). Throughout this Note, references to the "benefits" of participating in state systems
describe these unique aspects of the state programs. A detailed exploration of these rehabilitative programs available in various states, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 257 (1999).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1320-21 (41h Cir. 1996).
11. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 502, 88
Stat. 1109, 1134-35 (1974).
12. "Our common criminal law did not differentiate between the adult and the minor ....
The child was arrested, put into prison, indicted by the grand jury, tried by a petit jury, under all
the forms and technicalities of our criminal law.. . ." Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909). Age was irrelevant except in the application of legal presumptions. See United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 310 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Robert Bienstock, The
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 14 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 214, 215 (1939). For example, at common law, persons under the age of seven were irrebuttably presumed incapable of entertaining a
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federal government possessed extremely limited criminal authority. 3
Federal criminal law rarely dealt with crimes traditionally punishable
by the states, instead reaching only conduct affecting the operations of
the national government. 14 Since minors rarely violated these federal
laws, the paths of federal prosecutors and children seldom crossed." In
the rare instances when juveniles did violate federal law, however,
federal prosecutors treated them in the same manner as adults. 6
The first independent juvenile justice system appeared in 1899
when the Illinois legislature established the Juvenile Court of Cook
County.17 Over the next ten years, more than thirty states adopted
similar systems to handle the punishment and rehabilitation of juveniles. 8 Most of these states prohibited criminal prosecution of children
except by special permission of juvenile court judges. 9 Such policies
resulted when Progressive reformers successfully convinced state
legislatures that young people should not face long-term incarceration
because prison would transform them into hardened criminals.' The
reformers believed that an alternative juvenile justice system would
transform young troublemakers into productive members of society.1

criminal intent. See Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1893); Bienstock, supra, at 215.
The same presumption applied to those between the ages of seven and fourteen, though this
presumption was rebuttable. See Allen, 150 U.S. at 558-59; Bienstock, supra,at 215.
13. See, e.g., United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45 (1869) (holding that the federal government does not possess any general police power); see also L.B. Schwartz, Federal
CriminalJurisdictionand Prosecutors'Discretion,13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 64-65 (1948)
(chronicling the development of federal criminal law); Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm
than Good: Assessing Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 458 (1994) (stating
"the federal government possessed extremely limited criminal authority prior to the Civil War").
14. See Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 117, 120 (1987); Chippendale, supra note 13, at 458. While certain congressional acts
expanded federal criminal law, see Miner, supra, at 120, 122-23, the Supreme Court prevented
any significant expansion until the twentieth century, see id. at 122-23.
15. Children rarely threatened the operations of the government and normally committed
petty crinles like shoplifting and truancy. See WALTER C. RECKLESS & MAPHEUS SMITH,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 1-6 (1932) (describing juvenile crimes like vandalism, truancy, and
larceny).
16. See United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214, 215 (N.D. Ala. 1957) (noting that, traditionally, "[tihe juvenile offender against the laws of the United States was treated and prosecuted in the same manner as an adult'); supranote 12.
17. See Mack, supra note 12, at 107. For more detail regarding the establishment of this
court, see JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY 43-46 (1998).
18. See Mack, supranote 12, at 107.
19. See id. at 109.
20. See Bienstock, supra note 12, at 215-16. For more detail regarding the general origins
and beliefs of the Progressive movement and its intersection with juvenile justice, see Feld,
supranote 1, at 334-40.
21. See Mack, supra note 12, at 107 (discussing the need to turn juveniles into "worthy citizen[s]" rather than criminals).
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By 1925, juvenile courts existed in all but two states.' Twenty years
later, an independent system designed to handle all juvenile offenders
existed in every state.' The first half of the twentieth century thus
witnessed the establishment of a tradition of placing juvenile offenders into rehabilitative state juvenile justice systems.
As the states developed these juvenile court systems, Congress
reconsidered how the federal government should treat juveniles violating federal law. Realizing that federal juvenile offenders would also
benefit from the rehabilitative programs available in state systems,2
Congress in 1932 authorized United States attorneys to forego federal
prosecution of juvenile offenders.' This power arose if the Department
of Justice found that the juvenile's actions violated both federal and
state law and that the surrender of federal jurisdiction served the best
interests of the United States as well as the juvenile.' The 1932 legislation thus constituted Congress's first attempt to further the best
interests of federal juvenile offenders by affording them access to the
rehabilitative programs available in recently developed state
systems. Significantly, though, the Act failed to establish separate
treatment of juveniles remaining in the federal system" and lacked
any general, comprehensive provisions on juvenile delinquency.'
Congress provided a degree of separate treatment when it
passed the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ('FJDA") in 1938.' An
important aim of this groundbreaking effort was to recreate some of
the beneficial features of state juvenile justice systems within the
federal system.3' Traditionally, juvenile offenders remaining in the
federal system had been prosecuted and detained like adult
offenders, 2 thus acquiring the lifelong stigma of being branded crimi-

22. Only Maine and Wyoming did not have juvenile courts by 1925. See Charles W. Thomas
& Shay Bilchik, ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 76 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 451 (1985).
23. See id.
24. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
25. See Act of June 11, 1932, Ch. 243, 47 Stat. 301 (allowing the Attorney General to surrender to the appropriate state authorities prosecution of juveniles under federal law).
26. See id.
27. See id. (displaying Congress's purpose to cooperate with the states "in the care and
treatment of juvenile offenders).
28. Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 311 & n.2 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
29. See United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214, 215 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
30. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), ch. 486, 52 Stat. 764 (1938).
31. See Borders, 154 F. Supp. at 215 (quoting legislative history to show FJDA's intent to
emulate some beneficial state procedures).
32. See id.; supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional treatment
of federal juvenile offenders).
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nals.33 In passing FJDA, however, Congress recognized that minors,
lacking maturity and judgment, often failed to comprehend the nature
of their actions. 4 What juvenile offenders most needed, therefore, was
the opportunity to reform themselves away from a criminal environment.35
The FJDA provided such an alternative by allowing the Attorney General to prosecute juvenile offenders remaining in the federal
system using methods differing from those traditionally available.'
Those juveniles37 not surrendered to state jurisdiction under the 1932
Act could be prosecuted for "juvenile delinquency" with the consent of
both the Attorney General and the accused.38 In effect, FJDA's broad
defmition of "juvenile delinquency" gave the Attorney General the
option to treat juveniles differently than adults.3 '
Significantly, though, the decisions to select this alternative
method of prosecution or surrender federal jurisdiction remained
entirely within the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General."'
The Attorney General also had complete discretion over the availabil-

33. See Borders, 154 F. Supp. at 215 (noting the legislative history's discussion of this harmful treatment).
34. See id. at 215-16; United States v. Fotto, 103 F. Supp. 430, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
35. See Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1947) ('The baneful effect of keeping young, first offenders in the common jail in company with case-hardened criminals has long
since had legislative attention, noticeably in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act. ...'); United
States ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17, 19 (D. Conn. 1959) (quoting letter of the
Attorney General regarding need to "reclaim" juveniles and make them "useful citizens).
Though "the federal system [had] no separate juvenile courts[,]" the separate treatment occurred
procedurally as the federal district courts under the FJDA could try juveniles for "juvenile
delinquency." Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335 (4th Cir. 1973).
36. See United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D.N.C. 1987). For example, those
charged with juvenile delinquency could not be sentenced to a term beyond the age of twentyone. See id.
37. The Act defined 'Juvenile" as an individual "seventeen years of age or under." Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), ch. 486, § 1, 52 Stat. 764, 764 (1938). The statute applied only
to juveniles whose underlying criminal offenses were not punishable by life imprisonment or
death. See § 2.
38. See id. The Act defined "juvenile delinquency" as "an offense against the laws of the
United States committed by a juvenile and not punishable by death or life imprisonment." § 1.
This charge of juvenile delinquency would supercede the specific offense allegedly committed by
the accused. See § 2.
39. See supra note 35-36; infra note 41.
40. See § 2. (retaining the discretion allowed in the 1932 Act for surrendering jurisdiction
and allowing prosecution for 'juvenile delinquen[cy] if the Attorney General in his discretion so
directs . .. . ) (emphasis added); see also Cox, 473 F.2d at 336; Smith, 675 F. Supp. at 311;
Barnes v. Pescor, 68 F. Supp. 127, 128 (W.D. Mo. 1946). The FJDA thereby allowed the Attorney
General to prosecute juveniles remaining in the federal system in the most desirable way
depending on the interests involved. See Stinnett, 178 F. Supp. at 19 ("[The FJDA] ... makes it
possible, if it appears desirable, to prosecute the more serious juvenile offenders in the same
manner as adults.").
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ity of rehabilitative programs."' With federal prosecutors retaining
such complete discretion over their fate, juvenile offenders could not
expect to receive the enhanced, specialized treatment available in the
state juvenile systems designed specifically to meet the needs of juveniles. Thus, FJDA failed to provide the full benefit of participating in
the state systems. These circumstances clearly demanded a legislative
response. If Congress intended to extend the availability of the benefits of juvenile justice programs, it needed to significantly revise the
framework of federal juvenile justice legislation.
Congress eventually implemented these sweeping changes in
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA") of
1974.4' The JJDPA created agencies, authorized funding, and furnished other federal assistance in order to provide a "comprehensive,
coordinated approach" to improving juvenile justice in the states.43 The
Act also created the current statutory framework for determining
whether accused juveniles should face federal or state prosecution."
Specifically, JJDPA provides for automatic state jurisdiction over the
broadly defined charge of "juvenile delinquency." 45 By removing federal
prosecutors' discretionary control over jurisdiction, this provision
effectively established the current presumption in favor of state jurisdiction over juveniles committing federal offenses. 6 This presumption

41. The Act provided the Attorney General complete control over the provision of any public
or private rehabilitative programs, § 4, 52 Stat. 764, in contrast to the parallel authority of
experienced state juvenile judges, see supra note 8. For other reasons why this discretionary
power over the rehabilitation programs did not amount to the full benefit of participating in the
state systems, see infra note 186.
42. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 502, 88
Stat. 1109, 1134 (1974). Modern courts also refer to the existing legislation by its original title,
the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act. See United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1257 (6th
Cir. 1991). Congress amended the FJDA in 1948, though these changes were not substantial. See
Smith, 675 F. Supp. at 311; see also S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284 ("[Ihe Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act... [was] virtually unchanged
for... thirty-five years.").
43. 88 Stat. at 1109 (describing JJDPA as an act "[t]o provide a comprehensive, coordinated
approach to the problems of juvenile delinquency).
44. JJPDA, § 502. The definition of "juvenile" remained someone "who has not attained his
[or her] eighteenth birthday." § 501.
In addition to the changes to this statutory framework, further procedural change included,
for example, providing juveniles the rights to counsel, to confinement in a facility near the
juvenile's home, and to a speedy trial. See §§ 504-06.
45. § 502. The Act redefined "juvenile delinquency" as "the violation of a [federal] law...
committed by a person prior to his [or her] eighteenth birthday," and the amendment clarified
that for the "purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of
juvenile delinquency," the definition of "juvenile" would include those "who ha[d] not attained
[their] twenty-first birthday[s]." § 501.
46. See § 502; see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM.
JUST., at 45 (Fall 1994) (referring to the current statutory framework). The Attorney General
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can be overcome only by the Attorney General's proper certification.'
Accordingly, under JJDPA as originally enacted, any juvenile accused
of committing a federal offense was subject to state jurisdiction unless
the Attorney General, after an investigation, certified to a federal
district court that the state either (1) refused or lacked jurisdiction
over the juvenile or (2) lacked programs sufficient to meet the needs of
juveniles."8
Following certification, juvenile offenders enter the federal juvenile system to appear before a federal district court. 9 Under JJDPA,
the Attorney General currently retains the option of either charging
an offender with 'Juvenile delinquency" or seeking a transfer of the
offender to adult status."' If the Attorney General pursues a transfer,
however, JJDPA imposes certain procedural requirements that must
be met before juveniles remaining in the federal system may be criminally prosecuted as adults.5 ' Criminal prosecution may occur only after
a proper motion by the Attorney General and a finding by the district
court, after a hearing, that a transfer to adult status is in the "interest
of justice."5" JJDPA lists six factors for the district court to consider in
determining the appropriateness of allowing criminal prosecution of
the juvenile.' Thus, the statute explicitly provides for judicial review

retained discretion over the availability of rehabilitative programs for juvenile offenders remaining in the federal system. See JJDPA § 510.
47. The relevant part of the section read:
A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency shall not be
proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General,
after investigation, certifies to an appropriate district court of the United States
that the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State (1) does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such
alleged act of juvenile delinquency, or (2) does not have available programs and
services adequate for the needs of juveniles.
If the Attorney Generaldoes not so certify, such juvenile shall be surrenderedto the appropriate legal authoritiesof such State.
§ 502 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. For the current statute regarding federal juvenile transfers, which has changed little
since JJDPA, see 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
51. § 502, 88 Stat. at 1134; see also United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D.N.C.
1987).
52. JJDPA § 502. This option of criminal prosecution, however, was only available for juveniles who, at the age of sixteen or older, committed felonies which were traditionally punishable
by a maximum of ten years or more imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death. See id.
53. Id. These factors included
the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense;
the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior juvenile delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature
of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; [and] the
availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems. Id.
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of the merits of a prosecutor's motion to transfer a juvenile to adult
status.' Considered together, the procedural requirements of JJDPA
increase the probability that juvenile offenders will avoid criminal
prosecution by facing a lesser charge of juvenile delinquency, even if
they remain in the federal system.'
Congress did not revise this legislation again until the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.' Procedural amendments in
this Act subtly, yet significantly, altered the assessment of whether
federal or state courts should handle a juvenile offender." In addition
to the two potential justifications for Attorney General certification
originally articulated in JJDPA,58 Congress added a third: certification
that "the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony.., and
that there is a substantial [fjederal interest in the case or the offense
to warrant exercise of [f]ederal jurisdiction."59 This amendment effectively completed the current framework governing delinquency proceedings for juveniles committing federal crimes.'
The structure of this statute, currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §
5032,1 has changed little since this 1984 legislation2 and remains

54. See id. (requiring a "hearing" by the federal district court to determine whether the
"transfer would be in the interests of justice").
55. Id. This increased possibility was available regardless of the nature of the crime. See
Smith, 675 F. Supp. at 311 (stating that, for the first time, "juveniles who were alleged to have
committed offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment were.., not excluded from the
protections of the Act").
56. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1201, 98 Stat. 1976,
2149-50.
57. Id.
58. See supratext accompanying note 48.
59. § 1201, 98 Stat. at 2149-50. Additionally, in place of "a [felony] crime of violence," the
statute enumerated certain offenses that could give rise to a certification, id., which currently
includes "section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act... or [certain sections] of the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act." 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
Though this amendment could be read to require "a substantial [flederal interest" to accompany all three methods of certification, courts generally find that this phrase only applies to the
third method of certification. See, e.g., United States v. Male Juvenile, 148 F.3d 468, 470 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the majority of cases which find that the "substantial federal interest"
requirement applies only to the crime-of-violence method of certification).
60. Less significant amendments adjusting statutory language and adding to the enumerated acts allowing certification occurred in, for example, 1988, 1990, 1994 and 1996. See 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (describing these amendments).
61. The relevant portion of the statute currently reads:
A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency, other than a violation of law committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States for which the maximum authorized term of imprisonment does not exceed
six months, shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the
Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the
United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not
have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such
alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and
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divisible into two main portions. First, as described above, the statute
creates a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction and outlines the
three routes through which a federal prosecutor can overcome this
presumption.' Second, if able to overcome this presumption through
the certification process, the Attorney General may move in federal
district court to transfer the juvenile to adult status."
Federal juvenile justice legislation has remained silent with respect to the possibility of judicial review of the Attorney General's
certification decisions since its inception.' The statutes do not suggest
any potential procedural requirements that might help to ensure an
accurate determination of the enumerated criteria for denying juveniles' participation in state juvenile justice systems.' Faced with this
statutory silence, juvenile offenders disputing Attorney General certification decisions have naturally sought clarification of the availability of judicial review.

HI.APPELLATE DECISIONS REGARDING JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF CERTIFICATION
Absent congressional direction regarding the appropriate extent of judicial review, the issue inevitably arose in the federal courts.
Juvenile offenders have recently appeared before several circuit
courts, asking for review of prosecutors' decisions denying them participation in state juvenile justice systems. Of the circuits that have
faced this issue, 7 a majority has held that certification results in vir-

services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or an [enumerated] offense... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.
Id.
62. Compare Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93-415,
§ 502, 88 Stat. 1109, 1134 (1974), with supra note 61 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5032 as currently
enacted).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; supranotes 44-48, 57-59 and accompanying text.
64. See § 5032; supranotes 49-54 and accompanying text.
65. See § 5032; see also United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1997).
66. See§ 5032.
67. These circuits include the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh
and D.C. Circuits, leaving the remaining circuits silent on the issue. See, e.g., United States v.
Smith, 178 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1999) (listing some of these circuits), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 257
(1999). Though the Ninth Circuit is not generally regarded as part of either side of the issue, see,
e.g., id. (not listing the Ninth Circuit); United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 538 (7th Cir. 1998)
(not listing the Ninth Circuit), this circuit stated before the 1984 amendments that the trial
judge had "no duty [to] independently ... investigate and determine if the certificate refers to the
proper state court." United States v. Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1981).
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tually automatic federal jurisdiction, with no opportunity for judicial
review of prosecutors' substantive judgments regarding the decision to
certify.' Generally, though, these courts have allowed review for bad
0 Standing
faith' or lack of technical compliance with the statute."
alone on the other end of the spectrum, the Fourth Circuit allows full
judicial review of the Attorney General's certification decisions. 7' A few
circuits fall somewhere in between these two contrasting positions and
ambiguously allow varying degrees of judicial review. 2

This circuit, however, provided little useful analysis, relied on factors not relevant to this Note,

and never fully addressed the issue like the other circuits. See id. at 1077-78 & n.6.
68. See Smith, 178 F.3d at 25; Jarrett,133 F.3d at 541; In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 216
(D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1997); United States
v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1996). Some circuit decisions disallowing judicial review
occurred before the 1984 amendment. See United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1477-78 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378, 1381 (2d Cir. 1975).
69. See, e.g., I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 511. For an example of "bad faith" in the context of such
executive determinations, see the Second Circuit decisions cited in C.G., 736 F.2d at 1478.
70. 'Technical compliance" includes, for instance, whether "the verifying party is . . . a
proper delegate of the Attorney Generar' or whether "the certification [was] filed in a timely
fashion." I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 511 & n.4 (quoting C.G., 736 F.2d at 1477); see also Jarrett,133 F.3d
at 541. Such superficial review fails to reach the substance of the prosecutor's judgment. See,
e.g., I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 512 (finding the prosecutor's "subjective" assessment unreviewable).
A few courts in the majority have noted the pliant nature of the proper extent of this "technical" review. For example, the Fifth Circuit noticed that "technical" review could be extended to
include more substantive aspects of prosecutor decisions, e.g., whether the felony at issue was
one of violence, while remaining silent on the overall acceptability of these decisions. See Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 304 n.10. While it erroneously insisted that such review "did
not... consider whether the government's certification was substantively reviewable," id.; see
also infra Part lI.C (displaying why such a characterization is erroneous), the Juvenile No. 1
court nevertheless declined to "consider the propriety of review under these circumstances."
Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 304 n.10. Another decision, Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 213 (review of
whether the crime was one of violence), casually lumped these higher degrees of review with
other "facial" determinations when acknowledging the availability of review to determine "facial
adequacy" of federal jurisdiction, id. These courts can be grouped with the majority that only
allows review for "technical compliance" because their casualness or silence is outweighed by
their substantial reliance on the analysis of the preceding majority circuits. See Sealed Case, 131
F.3d at 212-13 (setting forth the majority's analysis without objection before rejecting the Fourth
Circuit's minority stance); Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 304 (explicitly following the Eleventh
Circuit); see also infra text accompanying note 140 (contrasting these courts with the much more
vague and tortured Third Circuit analysis).
71. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1320-21 (4th Cir. 1996). Despite
the building opposition of the majority of the other circuits, the Fourth Circuit remains firm in
requiring review. See United States v. T.E.S., No. 98-4423, 1998 WL 774144, at *3 (4th Cir. Nov.
6, 1998) (unpublished table decision); United States v. NJB, 104 F.3d 630, 632 (4th Cir. 1997).
72. See United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 1998); Impounded, 117
F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1991).
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A. The Majority
The majority analysis traces its roots to the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Vancier.73 In a decision preceding the
Crime Control Act of 1984 amendments, the Vancier court based its
holding against judicial review on two general analytic foundations."'
First, the Vancier court examined the language of JJDPA and concluded that Congress did not intend to allow judicial review of certification decisions.75 The court initially noted the absence of any explicit
provision authorizing judicial review." It also emphasized the lack of
any "standards" that might guide judicial determination of whether
the Attorney General had correctly certified that state jurisdiction was
inappropriate or that state juvenile justice programs were
inadequate. " The court concluded that the absence of such express
provisions indicated Congress's intentional disapproval of judicial
review."8
The Second Circuit's second analytical foundation relied on the
principle that the executive branch normally possesses the authority
to make unreviewable decisions in connection with law enforcement."
Specifically, the court cited several prior decisions allowing the Attorney General to make various unreviewable determinations regarding
the prosecutorial process.' After defining this category of "unreviewable determinations," the court determined that JJDPA certification
fell squarely within this category. 1 In effect, the Vancier court charac-

73. United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Impounded, 117 F.3d at
733 ('CThe seminal case is United States v. Vancier.") Before the 1984 Amendments, the Eleventh
Circuit was "persuaded by the analysis" of the Vancier court and quoted the decision's relevant
analysis in full. See C.G., 736 F.2d at 1478 (quoting Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1380-81).
74. Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1380-81.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1380.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1380-81. In the court's own words, it determined that Congress did not intend
to "grant the power to the courts to make the final decision." Id. at 1381 (emphasis added).
79. See id.
80. See id. The Second Circuit cited its decision in United States v. Carter,493 F.2d 704 (2d
Cir. 1974), and listed several other cases denying review of prosecutorial decisions. See Vancier,
515 F.2d at 1381 (citing Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431-34 (1956) (involving the
determination by a United States Attorney that the public interest required that a witness be
compelled to testify under a grant of immunity); United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 115455 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing certification by the Attorney General that the proceeding involved a
person believed to have participated in organized crime); United States v. Comiskey, 460 F.2d
1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1972) (assessing certification by a United States Attorney that an
interlocutory appeal is not being taken for the purposes of delay)).
81. Id.
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terized certification as a traditional exercise of exclusive prosecutorial
discretion.'
Significantly, though, both Vancier and its subsequent Eleventh Circuit companion, United States v. C.G.,' were decided before
Congress amended JJDPA with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984. The introduction of a third possible criterion for overcoming
the presumption of state jurisdiction-certification that the crime
involved both a violent felony and a "substantial federal interest"presented a radically different justification for the imposition of
federal jurisdiction. ' After the 1984 amendments, therefore, Vancier
and its progeny were no longer entirely relevant for situations
involving this new basis for certification under § 5032.' Nevertheless,
the majority of courts addressing this issue after 1984 sustained the
vitality of the Vancier decision.' Though some courts did not cite
Vancier directly, the circuits in the majority clearly adopted and
expanded upon its two-part analytical framework."
Like the Second Circuit in Vancier, courts considering appeals
arising under the post-1984 statute consistently emphasized the absence of explicit language authorizing judicial review.88 These courts

82. Id. (equating certification with the jurisprudence upholding traditional prosecutorial
discretion). See generally Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (explaining
traditional prosecutorial discretion).
83. United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1478 (11th Cir. 1984).
84. Compare Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1201, 98 Stat.
1976, 2149-50, with Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93415, § 502, 88 Stat. 1109, 1134-35 (1974).
85. See United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 511 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[Olur decision in United
States v. C.G ...does not resolve entirely the matter before us... [since] the statutory language
at issue here ... was added to § 5032 in 1984 subsequent to our decision in United States v.

C.G.').
The current status of the Second Circuit's position is unclear after its decision in United
States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859 (2d Cir. 1995). The court actually looked for the quality of violence in
the offense, while ignoring its decision in Vancier and citing a minority-leaning Eighth Circuit
decision in the process. See Doe, 49 F.3d at 866-67 (citing United States v. Juvenile Male, 923
F.2d 614, 620 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (evaluating the
Eight Circuit decision). But without any analysis or recognition of its inconsistency, see, e.g., Doe,
49 F.3d at 866-67 (citing the Eighth Circuit only for the outcome of its review rather than for its
decision allowing review), the Second Circuit's position on the matter remains entirely unresolved after the 1984 amendments.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997); I.D.P.,
102 F.3d at 510-11 (adopting the analysis of Vancier and C.G. in the post-1984 jurisprudence).
87. See, e.g., Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 306-07 (looking to legislative history to show statutory intent); I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 510-11.
88. See United States v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 257
(1999); United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 539 (7th Cir. 1998) ('There is no congressional
invitation for the courts to make... [such an] assessment.'); In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208,
212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing, inter alia, Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1380); Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at
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further observed, however, that § 5032 specifically required judicial
review of Attorney General decisions to pursue the transfer of juvenile
offenders to adult status. 9 By contrasting this requirement with the
statute's silence regarding judicial review of certification decisions,
courts adopting the majority position determined that this exclusion
revealed Congress's intent to disallow review of certifications.' Similarly, these courts compared the lack of suggested standards for judicial review of certification with the six standards Congress had included in § 5032 to assist in judicial review of the Attorney General's
transfer recommendations.9 1 The absence of explicit standards for
judicial review of certification decisions, contrasted with the provision
of such explicit standards for reviewing transfer recommendations,
convinced the majority of circuits that Congress did not intend to
allow judicial review of certification."
Some majority courts expanded on the statutory intent analysis by looking to the legislative history preceding the Crime Control
Act. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, for example, examined a passage
from a Senate report regarding the addition of the third certification
category.93 A passage in this report indicated legislative intent to
"afford" the Attorney General the authority to determine whether a
certain crime posed a special federal interest. 4 The Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits interpreted this language to mean that Congress intended to
give federal prosecutors sole authority to certify juveniles for federal
prosecution. 5

304 (citing, inter alia, Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1380); I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 511 (citing Vancier, 515
F.2d at 1380-81).
89. See Smith, 178 F.3d at 25; Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539; Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 212; Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 304; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 511; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) ("[Ciriminal prosecution ...may be begun by motion to transfer of the Attorney General in
the appropriate district court ....if such courtfinds, after hearing,such transfer would be in the
interest of justice.') (emphasis added).
90. See Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539 ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.') (alteration in
original) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); see also Smith, 178 F.3d at
25; Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 212; Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 304-05; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 511.
91. See Smith, 178 F.3d at 25; Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539; Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 212-13;
Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 304; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 511, 513; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (listing
these six standards).
92. See Smith, 178 F.3d at 25; Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539; Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 212; Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 511, 513; see also supra note 90 (Russello quotation).
93 See Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 306-07; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 512.
94. See Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 306-07;
RD.P.,
102 F.3d at 512.
95. See Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 306-07; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 512.
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A more recent circuit court decision denying judicial review of
certification expanded upon the statutory intent analysis by examining the syntax of the certification language. In United States v. Jarrett, the Seventh Circuit held that the language of § 5032 unambiguously vested complete discretion in the Attorney General.' By
characterizing the statutory language as conditioning federal jurisdiction upon the mere existence of any technically compliant certification,
the court concluded that § 5032 required complete deference to the
subjective findings of the Attorney General.97 This interpretation thus
precluded objective review of whether a substantial federal interest
actually existed. 8 In effect, the Jarrettcourt found that the Attorney
General's act of certification constituted the only criterion required to
overcome the initial presumption in favor of state jurisdiction."
Adhering to the analytical framework established in Vancier,
courts in the post-1984 majority have also emphasized the traditional
assumption that any exercise of prosecutorial discretion is unreviewable.'" In addition, these courts have expanded upon this general
premise, specifically focusing on the traditional prosecutorial discretion of federal prosecutors. 1 For example, courts in the majority have
repeatedly compared the certification determination to the federal
prosecutor's decision to prosecute any case in the federal forum.'
Finding that both decisions draw on executive considerations such as
enforcement priorities and deterrence value, the majority of circuits
have determined that certification merely constitutes another exercise

96. Jarrett,133 F.3d at 538.
97. See id. at 538-39.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 306 (referring to the description of general prosecutorial
discretion in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)); see also supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text (discussing the second part of Vancier's analytical framework).
101. See Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539-40 (looking to the United States Attorneys' Manual); In re
Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 214, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referring to the decision to "invoke the
power of the federal government"); Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305-06 (looking to the United
States Attorney's Manual); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 510-11 (11th Cir. 1996) (comparing the certification power to the federal "authority to decide whether to prosecute a case in a
federal forum").
Though the cases cited in Vancier regarding prosecutorial discretion solely address federal
prosecutors, the category in which the court placed the certification process was situations where
executive branches generally have this unreviewable authority. See United States v. Vancier, 515
F.2d 1378, 1381 (2nd Cir. 1975) ("[This] falls into the category of unreviewable determinations to
be made, in this instance, by the Attorney General.') (emphasis added). The court never distinguishes any specific authority held by federal prosecutors. Compare id., with Sealed Case, 131
F.3d at 214.
102. See Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 214; Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 306; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at
512-13; see also Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 539 ("Obviously, first and foremost among this genre is the
ultimate decision to prosecute someone in federal court....').
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of a prosecutor's unreviewable power to invoke the federal government's judicial authority."3
Some circuits also looked to the United States Attorneys' Manual for support in sustaining the exclusive discretion of federal prosecutors.' Again emphasizing the omission of clear statutory standards,
these courts pointed to the Manual's repeated use of the term "substantial federal interest!' as a guideline for the appropriate exercise of
general prosecutorial discretion."°5 Describing the "substantial federal
interest!' inquiry as vital to federal prosecutors in any decision invoking federal jurisdiction, these circuits characterized the certification
process as a regular and appropriate exercise of federal prosecutors'
discretionary powers."
B. The Minority
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Juvenile
Male #1 stands alone in explicitly allowing full judicial review of the
entire certification process.' In Juvenile Male #1, the court initially
conceded that the Attorney General's decision regarding the presence
of "a substantial federal interest' deserves at least some deference due
to its similarity with the forms of prosecutorial discretion! traditionally
free from judicial review.0 8 Unlike the courts in the majority, however,
the Fourth Circuit also required an objective review of whether a
substantial federal interest actually existed.1" The court thus required
judicial review of the substantive determinations of federal prosecutors.
The Fourth Circuit used the Supreme Court's Decision in
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno"' as the focus of its analysis."' The
Lamagno Court upheld judicial review of an Attorney General certifi-

103. See, e.g., Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 214. The District of Columbia Circuit also found that
§ 5032 certification enabled federal prosecutors to interpret statutes in accordance with their
constitutional duty to "faithfully executeD" laws invoking federal jurisdiction. Id. at 215 (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). Characterized in this manner, executive branch certification comports
with the three-part constitutional structure of the federal government. See id.
104. See Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539-40; Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305-06.
105. See Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539-40; Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305-06.
106. See Jarrett,133 F.3d at 539-40; Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305-06. The Seventh Circuit
went so far as to characterize the Attorney General's certification as "essentially a perfunctory
corollary to the decision to prosecute itself." Jarrett,133 F.3d at 540.
107. United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996).
108. Id. at 1319.
109. See id. (stating that "a court must first satisfy itself that there is indeed a substantial
federal interest before jurisdiction can be assumed over the juvenile').
110. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).
111. See Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1319-21.
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cation, under the Westfall Act,"' that certain federal employees being
sued for negligence had acted within the "scope of employment."". The
Juvenile Male #1 court claimed that the Lamagno decision established
a presumption that Congress intended to allow judicial review of
executive determinations whenever the relevant statute is ambiguous
regarding the availability of judicial review." ' The Fourth Circuit
further suggested that "weightier considerations of a different sore'
than those present in Lamagno mandated judicial review in the juvenile justice arena."' Given the statutory focus on rehabilitation of
juveniles within state systems, the court reasoned that congressional
intent to authorize judicial review of certification decisions should be
presumed." '
To overcome this presumption, the Fourth Circuit required
persuasive evidence indicating specific congressional intent to deny
judicial review in § 5032 certification cases." ' After examining both
the statutory language and legislative history of § 5032, however, the
court found no such evidence."' In fact, the court determined that the
legislation indicated the contrary."9 Looking at the post-JJDPA development of the federal juvenile justice statute, the Juvenile Male #1

112. The Supreme Court's explanation of the Westfall Act states:
When a federal employee is sued ... [in tort], the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (commonly known as the Westfall Act)
empowers the Attorney General to certify that the employee was acting within the
scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the
claim arose. Upon certification, the employee is dismissed from the action and the
United States is substituted as defendant.
Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 419-20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For more detail
regarding the Westfall Act, see generally id. at 419-23.
113. Id. at 419-20, 434.
114. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1319 (articulating "[the] basic principlefl... that executive
determinations generally are subject to judicial review and that mechanical judgments are not
the kind federal courts are set up to render') (quoting Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 434); see also id. at
1320 (finding a "presumption of judicial review"). Despite its claims regarding Lamagno, the
Eighth Circuit court should have turned to other Supreme Court decisions to find the presumption it sought. See infra note 269.
115. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1319-20. The Fourth Circuit claimed that the Lamagno
Court had relied heavily upon two considerations in upholding congressionally authorized
judicial review: the Westfall Act certification involved financial incentives for the Attorney
General; and the certification was dispositive of a court controversy. See id. at 1319. Although
neither of these factors applied in Juvenile Male #1, the Fourth Circuit found "weightier considerations of a different sort" in the juvenile justice arena. Id. at 1319-20.
116. See id. at 1319, 1320. Although the Fourth Circuit never explicitly defines these
"weightier considerations", id. at 1319, they apparently relate to the "juvenile justice arena," id.
Examining the remainder of the decision, the only juvenile justice consideration mentioned was
the federal statute's emphasis upon the rehabilitation occurring in state systems. See id. at 1320
&n.9.
117. See id. at 1319-20 (quoting Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 423).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1320.
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court characterized the 1984 amendments as mere blips in the larger
development of the legislation. Conceding that the amendments
vastly expanded the availability of federal jurisdiction as a response to
the growing national problem of juvenile crime,' the Fourth Circuit
nonetheless concluded that the amendments did not alter the legislation's focus on rehabilitation in the state systems." The court determined that the evidence of a statutory focus on state rehabilitation
defeated any claim that Congress had at the same time intended to
create-through unreviewable executive certification-automatic
federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders."' In stark contrast to the
majority, the Fourth Circuit took the opposite position that Congress
intended to allow full judicial review of federal prosecutors' certification decisions.
C. Between the Extremes
Some circuits fall closer to the majority's position while hinting
at the possibility of some level of judicial review of the substantive
decisions supporting certification. Generally, while not absolutely
rejecting review in certification cases, the decisions of these circuits
seem to form an analytical coalition with the majority against
review." To the extent that they deviate from the majority view, these
intermediate decisions constitute attempts to achieve consistency with
the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Juvenile Male."
In Juvenile Male, the Eighth Circuit initially appeared to reject
the extreme majority position. Unconvinced by the Second Circuit's
analysis in Vancier, the Juvenile Male court reviewed the substantive
conclusions reached by the federal prosecutor." Finding a "clear mandate" in § 5032 for a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction, the
court required the federal prosecutor's full compliance with the statute's criteria for overcoming this presumption."7 Accordingly, the court
investigated-through an examination of the definition of violence
employed in other statutes-the federal prosecutor's certification that

120. Id.
121. See id. (finding that the third prong, which focused on the offense rather than the offender, greatly expanded the possibility for invoking federal jurisdiction).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1319-20.
124. See United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) (listing these groups of
decisions together as supporting the majority position).
125. United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 618-20 (8th Cir. 1991).
126. Id. at 617.
127. Id. at 618.
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a "crime of violence" had in fact occurred.' In so assessing the prosecutor's compliance with the statute, the Eighth Circuit apparently
engaged in a substantial review of the merits of the certification decision."
A convoluted attempt to reconcile Juvenile Male with the prevailing majority view appeared in the Third Circuit's opinion in Impounded.3" Rejecting the minority stance on judicial review, the Third
Circuit instead largely adopted the majority analysis. 3 ' Accordingly,

128. See id.
129. See id. at 617. The extent of the court's decision in Juvenile Male is itself uncertain.
First, the court characterized its review as consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's C.G. decision.
See id. In C.G., however, the Eleventh Circuit allowed review only of technical requirements and
did not allow "inquir[y] into the correctness of the [federal prosecutor's] statements made in the
certification." United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1984), quoted in Juvenile
Male, 923 F.2d at 617; see also supra note 70 (explaining the majority's stance on review for
"technical compliance"). In contrast, Juvenile Male reviewed the federal prosecutor's decision
that the offense in the certification constituted a crime of violence. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d at
617 (allowing the determination of "whether the United States Attorney certified that one of the
crimes specified by Congress had been alleged"). Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit characterized
its inquiry as consistent with the C.G. decision. See id. Since its decision was not actually
consistent with this precedent, its alleged compliance with C.G. casts some doubt on the extent of
review the court would allow or how the decision should be viewed. See id. Compare In re Sealed
Case, 131 F.3d 208, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1997), with United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 512 n.5
(11th Cir. 1996) (illustrating that the courts in the majority have disagreed on how to classify
Juvenile Male).
Moreover, Juvenile Male does not reveal whether the Eighth Circuit would allow the full
substantive review supported by the Fourth Circuit. The court did not need to address the issue
of whether "a substantial federal interest" existed because the federal prosecutor failed to make
such a claim. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d at 620. Some courts, including the minority court, have
plausibly interpreted this inaction as requiring only a statement of a federal interest to avoid
judicial review. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996).
Regardless, since the court broadly stated that review would be allowed in order to establish
with certainty that the Attorney General had properly certified a crime specified by Congress
(which would presumably include a crime raising a federal interest) at least when statutory
standards are available, this Eighth Circuit decision at least approaches the minority position in
its result. See Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d at 618-19; see also I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 512 n.5 ("[WMe
recognize that the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have interpreted section 5032 to require judicial
review of certifications.... 2).
130. Impounded, 117 F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1997). The other circuits addressing the Eighth Circuit decision before Impounded had explicitly found that the Juvenile Male decision allowed for
some degree of substantive judicial review. See I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 512 n.5 ("[W]e recognize that
the Fourth and Eighth Circuit have interpreted section 5032 to requirejudicialreview of certifications... ") (emphasis added); Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1317-18 ("[The Eight Circuit] has
held that the courts have the authority to review more than the mere form of the government's
certification.") (emphasis added).
131. This included adopting the analysis of the Fourth Circuit's dissenting judge. See Impounded, 117 F.3d at 732-33, 736. The court also addressed federalism concerns by finding that,
although determinations regarding the proper relationship between the states and the federal
government may be best left to the courts, the lack of any judicially useful standards in the
statute combined with the prosecutorial character of the decision leaves the decision ill-suited for
the judiciary. See id. at 736.
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the Impounded court held that the certification decision involved in
the case should be insulated from review since the prosecutor fulfilled
the statutory requirements by demonstrating that no state would
accept jurisdiction."2 In this light, Impounded represents an apparent
endorsement of the analysis employed by the majority.
Simultaneously, however, the Impounded court endorsed the
decision in Juvenile Male, finding the Eighth Circuit's analysis consistent with both the majority view and its own decision.133 Focusing on
the Juvenile Male court's use of existing statutory standards in its
review of the determination that a crime of violence had been committed, the Third Circuit found that this constituted an acceptable degree
of review since it did not disturb decisions traditionally left to prosecutorial discretion.' In contrast to the majority's strict opposition to
judicial review, therefore, the Third Circuit apparently would allow at
least some substantive review of certification decisions."
The effort to co-opt Juvenile Male may account for the Third
Circuit's conclusion that, because the Attorney General had also certified that state courts had refused jurisdiction, "[the court] need
not.., discuss whether the challenged crime is one of violence or
whether a substantial federal interest is present. 1 6 While a court
completely aligned with the majority would presumably disallow a
discussion of any certification decision,'37 the Third Circuit seemed to
emphasize that the existence of a legitimate alternative basis for
certification precluded substantive review. Thus, while the Third
Circuit's approach closely resembles that of the prevailing majority,'38
the court's failure to specifically prohibit substantive review casts
some doubt on its position. The implied acceptance of the Juvenile
Male decision suggests that the Third Circuit would allow some level

132. Id. at 737.
133. Id. at 734.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 734 n.4. (endorsing the possibility of reviewing "some aspects of a § 5032 certification, but not others). At the very least, the Third Circuit would allow use of statutory
standards defining violence to review whether the charged crime was one of violence. See id. at
736.
Thus, the majority's subsequent hasty acceptance of the Third Circuit's position, see, e.g.,
United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 538 (7th Cir. 1998), is problematic, see Impounded, 117
F.3d at 735-36, 737; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 512 n.5 (expressly disagreeing with the review allowed in
both the Fourth and Eighth Circuits).
136. See Impounded, 117 F.3d at 737.
137. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
138. See Impounded, 117 F.3d at 732-33, 736.
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of substantive review, especially regarding those aspects of the certification open to interpretation using existing statutory standards. 9
The Eighth Circuit itself later attempted to conform to both the
majority position and its own previous decision in Juvenile Male.'"
Reversing course in United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., the Eighth
Circuit employed the majority analysis and concluded that it could not
review the prosecutor's decision of whether a substantial federal interest existed.1 ' Rather than overruling its previous decision in Juvenile Male, however, the court attempted to reconcile the two
decisions."' Citing its earlier opinion for support, the court behaved
like the Third Circuit by remaining receptive to substantive review of
those aspects of certification that did not suffer from a lack of clear
statutory standards. "3 Thus, the Eighth Circuit has realigned itself
closer to the majority position but apparently allows at least some
review of the Attorney General's certification decisions.'"
TV. JUVENILES' STATUTORY INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING
IN STATE SYSTEMS
The decisions of courts on both sides of the judicial review issue
share common themes. Regardless of their position, the circuits generally base their analysis on the intent of Congress and the character of

139. See id. at 730, 734 & n.4, 736.
140. After Impounded, other majority courts struggled with the Eighth Circuit's decision,
usually by mischaracterizing Juvenile Male as a mere assessment of the certification's technical
compliance to § 5032. See supra note 70 (discussing the pliant nature of review for "technical
compliance'); see also Jarrett,133 F.3d at 537 (reducing Juvenile Male to a decision regarding
the Government's failure to submit certain records and a full statement of certification). By
labeling Juvenile Male as a case assessing technical compliance, these courts remained true to
the majority's position and did not approach the vague conformity of the Third Circuit. Compare
Jarret, 133 F.3d at 537 (ignoring the substance of the Eighth Circuit's analysis and decision
allowing review), with Impounded, 117 F.3d at 734, 736 (attempting to reconcile its position with
Juvenile Male).
141. United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905, 906-09 (8th Cir. 1998).
142. See id. at 908 (citing United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1991)).
143. See id. (citing Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d at 617). In fact, the J.A.J. court encapsulated the
tortured attempts of the Third Circuit to remain consistent with Juvenile Male in a parenthetical. Id. (citing Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d at 617). In a section referring to the need for statutory
standards, the JA.J. court noted that its previous decision held "that judicial review was
available for § 5032 certification that [the] offense was a crime of violence." Id. (citing Juvenile
Male, 923 F.2d at 617). However, the court subtly stepped toward conformity with Juvenile Male
by succinctly finding that the existence of statutory standards anywhere was sufficient to allow
substantive review. See id. (mentioning only Juvenile Male's observation regarding the existence
of statutory standards and ignoring the analysis supporting substantive review).
144. See id.
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the entity making the certification decision."" Each side's analysis
interprets the statutory text and legislative history as evidence that
' In addition, each
Congress intended to support its particular view. 46
side characterizes the nature of the certification decision to suit its
own ends. While the majority of courts characterize the certification
decision as an exercise of traditional, unreviewable prosecutorial
discretion, the minority treats this same decision like an administrative function subject to a presumption of judicial review." '
More significantly, the legal analysis employed by both sides
shares a common major flaw: neither side has examined the potential
due process concerns surrounding certification.14 These concerns arise
whenever the government attempts to deprive an individual of a
statutorily provided interest. 9 For example, if the Attorney General's
certification decisions strip juveniles of an interest created by Congress, the Constitution requires a certain level of procedural accuracy
in determining whether a particular juvenile meets the statutory
criteria triggering denial of the entitlement." This section of the Note
argues that JJDPA establishes a significant statutory interest to
which the constitutional protections of procedural due process must
apply.
The creation of a statutory interest for federal juvenile offenders to participate in state juvenile justice systems depends upon the
existence of two conditions in the federal legislation. First, Congress
must provide the opportunity for federal juvenile offenders to participate in state systems while restraining federal prosecutors' discretion
to deny such participation. Without this restraint, federal jurisdiction
would be presumed, and the Attorney General's discretion would
automatically trump juvenile offenders' potential interest in participation in state systems. 5 ' Second, federal legislation must establish new
statutory benefits that do not substantially copy the benefits inhering

145. See generally supraPart III.
146. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (majority); United
States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1320 (4th Cir. 1996) (minority).
147. Compare Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 214, with Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1319.
148. See, e.g., Sealed Case, 131 F.3d at 214. For a discussion on the possibility of such an investigation hiding in the Fourth Circuit's rhetoric, see infra notes 264-70 and accompanying text.
149. See infra Part V.
150. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 551, 556-57 (1966); see also infra Part V.
151. See discussion supra Part II (describing the effects of the Attorney General's discretionary control over jurisdiction under the legislative regime preceding JJDPA). This proposition
assumes, of course, that the federal legislation is not an improper use of federal authority in an
area constitutionally reserved for the states. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
(1995) (declaring a congressional statute criminalizing gun possession near schools unconstitutional for overstepping federal authority).
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in state jurisdiction. A replication would not create a protected statutory interest in participating in state systems since juveniles remaining under federal jurisdiction would effectively receive the same entitlements available in state programs. ' Thus, an examination of
JJDPA is necessary to determine whether the statute in fact established a significant statutory interest for federal juvenile offenders in
participating in state systems.
The JJDPA's groundbreaking alteration of previous federal juvenile justice legislation satisfied the conditions necessary to create a
new statutory interest. The history, language, and effects of the Act
combined to establish a clear interest for federal juvenile offenders in
participating in state programs."u By redefining the role of federal
prosecutors, JJDPA constituted a significant statutory shift which
established federal juvenile offenders' protected interest in participating in state juvenile justice systems." Further, the Act reinforced
the statutory interest in participating in the state systems through
new policies designed to improve and enhance existing state programs
rather than replicating the benefit of participating in state programs
on a federal level.'"
A. FederalLegislationBefore JJDPA
Legislation regarding the appropriate federal role in juvenile
justice has consistently recognized that state systems offer important
opportunities for rehabilitating juvenile delinquents." The congressional acts of the 1930s provided the first opportunity for federal juvenile offenders to participate in these state systems." Notably, however, the early federal legislation did not create a statutory interest in
participation in state systems but instead gave the Attorney General
full discretion to decide whether to surrender jurisdiction to the

152. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 571 (1975) (stating that the Constitution only forbids
the government to "deprive," not replicate,interests created by "state statutes or rules entitling
the citizen to certain benefits') (emphasis added).
153. The JJDPA is
"structured on the premise that it is important 'to channel juvenile offenders out
of the adult criminal system and to provide for their treatment and rehabilitation.' . . . State juvenile justice systems are better equipped to carry out these
goals given the lack of meaningful federal programs, and the [requirement] for
certification [for federal jurisdiction over a juvenile] reflects this fact." Shepherd,
supra note 46, at 46 (quoting United States v. J.D., 525 F. Supp. 101, 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
154. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
1109 (1974).§ 502.
155. See generally id.
156. See supranotes 24-27 and accompanying text (describing the Act of 1932)
157. See supranotes 24-27, 38 and accompanying text.

1334

1VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1311

states.'58 Under these initial statutes, federal juvenile offenders' ability
to participate in the state system was merely a collateral effect of the
traditional federal prosecutors' authority over federal jurisdiction."9
B. Recasting the FederalProsecutorialRole
By sufficiently restraining federal prosecutors' authority,
JJDPA provided juvenile offenders with a significant statutory interest in participation in state systems. JJDPA for the first time established automatic state jurisdiction for all juvenile offenders. Though
not the first legislative limitation of prosecutorial discretion,"6 JJDPA
limited this discretion to an extent sufficient to block the federal
prosecutor's automatic control over jurisdiction and to establish juveniles' statutory interest in participation in state systems. 6 ' While prior
legislation left juvenile offenders' enjoyment of the benefits of state
systems dependent upon the discretion of federal prosecutors, JJDPA
mandated that all juvenile offenders would automatically enter state
systems unless the Attorney General certified that certain conditions
existed.62 Thus, JJDPA provided a strong presumption in favor of
state jurisdiction and its accompanying benefits." Participation in
state systems became a freestanding interest removable with the
finding of certain criteria, rather than an incidental effect of the
prosecutors' discretion.
The creation of a freestanding interest by the statutory presumption favoring participation in state systems transformed the role
of the Attorney General. After JJDPA, a federal statute, rather than
the Attorney General, determined which federal juvenile offenders
participated in state systems. The Attorney General's role after

158. See supranotes 26, 40 and accompanying text.
159. Compare supra notes 26, 40 and accompanying text (discussing the 1930s Acts' allowance of prosecutorial discretion), with United States v. Alexander, 333 F. Supp. 1213, 1216-17
(D.D.C. 1971) (noting "the [universally recognized] wide discretion vested in the [federal] prosecutor to bring changes or not .... to defer to a state or to select a federal forum" when analyzing
a District of Columbia act allowing similar prosecutorial discretion over the fate of juveniles in a
certain age group).
160. The FJDA had limited prosecutorial discretion by preventing the prosecutor from surrendering federal jurisdiction if the offense was punishable by death or life imprisonment. See
supra notes 37-38.
161. See United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1258-59 (6th Cir. 1991) (showing how
the Act "impliediy revoked the district courts' preexisting, largely unrestricted subject-matter
jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions against juveniles') (emphasis added).
162. Compare, e.g., Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), ch. 486, § 2, 52 Stat. 764, 765
(1938), with Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93-415,
§ 502, 88 Stat. 1109, 1134 (1974).
163. See Shepherd, supranote 46, at 45.
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JJDPA thus became that of an executive officer charged with determining whether, in any given case, a juvenile offender should be
stripped of the statutory entitlement to participation in state programs.6' Rather than acting as a federal prosecutor selecting criminal
charges or forums, the Attorney General's certification authority
amounts to an investigation of the circumstances surrounding a juvenile's situation in order to determine whether they trigger the criteria
allowing the removal of state jurisdictions. Thus, while access to the
benefits of state systems became a defined statutory interest independent from prosecutorial whims, the Attorney General was selected
to determine the availability of the congressionally mandated interest.
Facially, the changes could be characterized as mere adjustments to the discretion of federal prosecutors to impose federal jurisdiction in juvenile cases." In passing JJDPA, however, Congress
actually intended the greater effect of removing federal prosecutorial
discretion in order to make the benefits of state programs readily
available to federal juvenile offenders." Examining the larger historical context surrounding passage of JJDPA reveals that § 5032 was
part of a general legislative scheme designed to improve the existing
juvenile justice system for the benefit of young offenders. This intention is embodied in JJDPA's definition of "juvenile delinquency program[s]," which breaks down the components of such programs into
three broad types: (1) any activity targeted at treating or controlling
current delinquency; (2) any improvements of the juvenile justice
system; and (3) any activity designed to assist potential delinquents. 6 7
Aimed at improving these 'juvenile delinquency program [s],"'" JJDPA
broadly attempted to enhance any activity designed to control or prevent juvenile delinquency." Further, the catch-all provision including
any "improvement of the juvenile justice system" within the statutory
definition of "juvenile delinquency programs" reveals a broad intent to

164. JJPDA § 502, 88 Stat. at 1134; see also Shepherd, supra note 46, at 45.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 305-07 (5th Cir. 1997) (focusing
on federal prosecutor discretion for much of its examination of the certification process).
166. See Shepherd, supra note 46, at 46 (finding that "[s]tate juvenile justice systems are
better equipped to carry out [the rehabilitative] goals [of the federal legislation] given the lack of
meaningful federal programs" and that "the [requirement] for certification reflects this fact").
167. JJDPA defines a "juvenile delinquency program" as:
any program or activity related to juvenile delinquency prevention, control, diversion, treatment, rehabilitation, planning, education, training, and research, including any drug and alcohol abuse programs; the improvement of the juvenile
justice system; and any youth program ... for neglected, abandoned, or dependant youth and other youth who are in danger of becoming delinquent.
88 Stat. at § 103(3).
168. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
169. § 103(3).
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cover any activity not falling within the other two listed categories but
which nonetheless could be characterized as an effort to improve the
system."
JJDPA's adjustments to prosecutorial discretion certainly fall
under the broad umbrella of this definition. The new presumption in
favor of state jurisdiction enabled juvenile delinquents committing
federal offenses to enjoy the benefits of state programs." This significant statutory shift may be fairly characterized as a "program... related to juvenile delinquency control" or an "improvement
to the juvenile justice system."'7' Thus, rather than mere adjustments
to prosecutorial discretion, the changes engendered by JJDPA instead
qualified as significant components of the Act's "comprehensive coordinated approach" to juvenile justice. 3
In addition, the congressional findings and purposes articulated in JJDPA, as well as the Act's legislative history, indicate that
the objectives of the Act were focused not upon federal prosecutors'
authority but rather upon juveniles themselves.' 4 Congress set forth

170. Id.
171. See § 502. With rehabilitation occurring only within state systems, the Act's "channel[ing]" of these juveniles "to those agencies ... mandated... to deal with substantive human
and social issues" necessarily implies the presumption for state jurisdiction of federal offenders.
S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 4-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5287-88.
172. Compare JJDPA § 103(3), with JJDPA § 502. Further, since Congress attempted to improve the relationship between court officials elsewhere in JJDPA, the addition of a presumption
of which court officials should have these relationships must be viewed as connected to these
other changes. See §§ 204(b)(7), 241(f), 244(2)-(3); see also S. REP. NO. 93-1011, at 5, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5287 (referring to the need for "[a]ssistance to ... courts ... in their
efforts to control and reduce crimes committed by juveniles, to improve the quality of justice for
juveniles, and to deal effectively and humanely with offenders"); infra note 173.
173. 88 Stat. at 1109. Regarding the judicial process itself, the Act's legislative history
stated:
Juvenile delinquency efforts of necessity involve[, among other things,] the courts and
corrections and require cooperation from all agencies furnishing these services." [This]
statement [displays] the need to view the juvenile justice system as an entity which offers
a wide range of approaches and alternatives for coping with the juvenile crime problem.
The juvenile justice system must be viewed as a continuum of responses (including the
utilization of resources outside the formal system of police, courts, and corrections) which
are made to juvenile crime in an attempt to prevent and reduce its occurrence, the larger
aim of which is to assist youth in becoming productive members of society.
S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5286 (quoting The Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act-S. 3148 and S. 821 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 668 (1973)) (emphasis
added). This statement in the legislative history reveals Congress's intent to include the court
system, including adjustments to juveniles' access to courts, as part of the "comprehensive and
coordinated focus to the issues surrounding juvenile delinquency." Id.
174. JJPDA §§ 101-02; see also S. REP. NO. 93-1011, at 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5283, 5285 (The highest attention must be given to preventing juvenile delinquency, to minimizing the involvement of young offenders in the juvenile and criminal justice system and to
reintegrating delinquents and young offenders into the community.") (quoting NATIONAL
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several findings at the beginning of the Act highlighting its concerns
about juveniles.15 The Act noted, for example, that juveniles accounted
for half of the arrests in the United States but did not receive individualized justice or effective help.Y Moreover, rehabilitation programs failed to meet the needs of children addicted to illegal drugs or
to address the concerns of countless other potential delinquents.'7 In
light of these findings, the Act explicitly sought to improve the quality8
of juvenile justice programs in order to benefit juvenile offenders.
Congress asserted no other important objectives as justification for the
adjustment to federal prosecutors' discretion. Clearly, the new restrictions governing the Attorney General through the certification process
reflected a broad legislative intent to improve the plight of juvenile
offenders by affording them access to state systems. "9 To achieve this
objective, Congress's intentional removal of federal prosecutorial
discretion thereby transformed the role of the federal prosecutors in
order to provide what amounted to a statutory interest for federal
juvenile offenders.
C. Reinforcing the New Statutory Benefit
The JJDPA did not, however, provide federal assistance directly to juvenile delinquents. Instead, the Act's purposes and policies
were explicitly aimed at assisting state and local efforts to prevent and
respond to juvenile delinquency.'" Rather than a mere replication of
the benefits traditionally available to juveniles in state systems that
would make a jurisdictional change of no consequence to juveniles, 8 '
JJDPA must be viewed as reflecting Congress's intent to reinforce the
benefits available in state programs. By supporting and strengthening

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO

REDUCE
175.
176.
177.

CRIME 23 (1973)).
JJPDA § 101.
Id.
See id.

178. §§ 101-02.
179. See id.; see also S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5286
(arguing that juvenile delinquency efforts should include, in addition to the courts and corrections, "education, recreation, employment, [and] health services'); supra note 173 (noting the
"larger aim" of helping juveniles).
180. Section 102 lists the purposes and policies of the Act, which includes evaluations, see
§ 102(a)(1), technical assistance for the development of programs, see § 102(a)(2), research
efforts, see § 102(a)(3), national standards, see § 102(a)(4), assistance to state and local programs,
see § 102(a)(5), and resources, leadership and coordination for the improvement of the existing
juvenile system, see § 102(b). No direct involvement with juveniles is mentioned.
181. See supranote 152 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 571 (1975)).

1338

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:1311

existing state programs, Congress solidified federal juvenile offenders'
statutory interest in participation in state juvenile justice systems.
Though JJDPA discussed a "[f]ederal juvenile delinquency program," this program broadly referred to any efforts related to juvenile
delinquency conducted or funded by the federal government.'82 In
practice, this "federal program" fulfilled the Act's stated purposes
primarily through the provision of assistance and leadership to the
states. This involvement included conducting studies, disseminating
information, creating national standards, and providing training and
funding.'" None of this federal assistance, however, directly benefited
juvenile delinquents."u Similarly, JJDPA never gave federal administrative agencies any authority to engage in direct relationships with
juvenile offenders." Thus, rather than replicating the benefits of
participation in state systems, the "federal juvenile delinquency program" simply enhanced the benefits of that participation, thereby
reinforcing the newly created statutory interest of juveniles committing federal offenses."

182. JJPDA § 103. The Act created an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
within the Department of Justice which serves to implement and develop objectives for the
"[flederal juvenile delinquency program." § 201; see also § 204 (referring generally to the development of "[f]ederal juvenile delinquency programs").
183. See §§ 201-09, 241-62.
184. See id.; see also § 204(a) (authorizing the Administrator to implement policy goals for
"Federal juvenile delinquency programs" only "relating" to general efforts to improve "the
juvenile justice system in the United States" rather than programs actually attempting direct
relationships with juveniles) (emphasis added).
185. See generally Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974).
186. One aspect of federal juvenile policy deserves particular attention: the Act permitted the
federal government to form contracts with other government agencies to carry out the purposes
of the Act. e.g., JJPDA § 204(j). The statute currently expands on this authority. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 5665 (Supp. HI 1997). For example, the federal government could lease the availability
of space in the state juvenile justice system for juveniles in the federal system. See Shepherd,
supra note 46, at 46. Attempting to afford at least some rehabilitative programs to juveniles in
the federal system, Congress prudently established a means of funneling some benefits of the
state systems to federal juveniles as well. Such provisions, however, do not contradict the
conclusion that the federal government has provided juveniles a statutory interest in actual
participation in state systems. Notably, federal legislation has never explicitly required federal
agencies to enter into contracts for the benefit of federal juveniles offenders. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
5665. Rather, the executive branch retains the discretion to "establish" or "develop" state programs exclusively for juveniles in the state system, id., leaving federal juvenile offenders without
the full panoply of state rehabilitative programs, see Shepherd, supra note 46, at 46 (observing
"[a] lack of meaningful federal programs"). Juveniles remaining in the federal system, therefore,
cannot expect to receive the same level of benefits available in state systems. See id. Further, the
mere picking and choosing of some of these benefits does not amount to federal recreation of the
benefit available on the state level. See United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir.
1991) ("Congress recognized that the federal court system is at best ill equipped to meet the
needs of juvenile offenders.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also John Scalia, Juvenile
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For example, JJDPA created a Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Office in the Department of Justice. 8 ' The stated
responsibilities of this office included developing federal objectives,
priorities, and coordinated strategies to assist states in their efforts to
help troubled juveniles and prevent delinquency.'88 Significantly,
though, the Act did not authorize the office to provide any direct assistance to juveniles." Instead, the Act empowered the office to "assist
operating agencies which have direct responsibilit[y]" for helping
juveniles."
The JJDPA also created the National Institute for Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 9 ' Among other powers, the
JJDPA explicitly authorized this agency to gather information regarding the treatment and control of juvenile offenders and to train
those directly assisting juvenile delinquents.'9 2 Under JJDPA, Congress charged another federal agency, the Coordinating Council on
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, with coordinating all

Delinquents in the Federal Criminal System (last modified Dec. 15, 1997)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov /bjs/pub/ascii/jdfcjs.txt> ("Unlike State-level criminal justice systems,
the Federal system does not have a separate juvenile justice component.'); Thomas & Bilchik,
supra note 22, at 442-51 (describing the extensive history and development of independent state
juvenile justice systems and noting the absence of federal equivalents); supra note 8.
187. JJDPA § 201.
188. See § 204(a).
189. § 204(b) (authorizing, for example, the office to advise the executive branch and to conduct studies and compile evaluations regarding the results of the concentrated federal effort).
190. § 204(b)(2). Since no such organizations existed on the federal level, and since none were
created, the "operating agencies" referred to were presumably those existing in the states. See
id.; see also §§ 201-09, 241-62.
Congress further authorized the office to "provide technical assistance to Federal, State and
local governments, courts, and [other institutions] in the planning, establishment, funding,
operation, or evaluation of juvenile delinquency programs." § 204(b)(7). By not giving federal
agencies direct responsibility over juveniles, Congress intended this "assistance to [the] Federal ... government]" to include only "planning, establishment, funding" and other indirect roles
and left opportunities for direct involvement remaining with the states. Id.; see also §§ 201-09,
241-62. Though § 204 describes the federal and state governments as having similar authority, §
204(b)(7), the breadth of the phrase "juvenile delinquency programs" allowed Congress to group
all government activities together without distinguishing these activities based on their varying
degrees of direct involvement with juveniles. See § 103(3); supra notes 168-73 and accompanying
text.
191. § 241.
192. § 241(f). Congress intended for this Institute to "provide training for representatives of
Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers, teachers, and other educational personnel,
juvenile welfare workers, juvenile judges and judicial personnel, probation personnel, correctional personnel and other persons ...connected with the treatment and control of juvenile
offenders." Id. (emphasis added). Though the Act mentions "Federal' personnel, id., it does not
establish any new federal positions connected with juveniles. Thus, the term "Federal" necessarily applies to federal employees either indirectly connected to juvenile treatment and control or
previously involved directly with juveniles including law enforcement officers, judges, and
correctional officers in federal incarceration facilities. See id.; see also § 244(2).
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federal juvenile justice programs.'9 3 Congress, however, envisioned
these federal programs under the Council's control as nothing more
than indirect efforts to support state systems. Considered together,
the federal programs established under JJDPA, rather than replicating the benefits of state systems, reflected Congress's intent to organize state programs into a more effective and standardized set of rehabilitative programs for juveniles committing state and federal
crimes.'95
The legislative history surrounding the enactment of JJDPA
also presents persuasive evidence of Congress's desire to enhance
existing state juvenile justice programs. For example, the opening
statement of the Senate report accompanying the Act reveals that
JJDPA "provides for Federal leadership and coordination of the resources necessary to develop and implement at the State and local
community level effective programs for the prevention and treatment
of juvenile delinquency."'" The report further reveals that the Act
deliberately focused on state rehabilitative benefits because juvenile
delinquency is essentially a local problem to be dealt with by the
states, and accordingly the federal government's role should only be
one of assistance and leadership rather than one of direct involvement.9 ' With its state-level focus, the legislative history indicates that

193. § 206(c). The Act also formed an advisory committee to make recommendations regarding federal juvenile delinquency programs. See §§ 207-08.
194. The Act indicated that the federal role consisted only of the indirect efforts of agencies,
redefining the framework of the federal juvenile court system, and providing funding for state
programs. See generally Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No.
93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974). Accordingly, federal agencies merely assisted or reformed existing
state systems by promulgating standards, see §§ 204(b)(2), 247, conducting studies and surveys,
see §§ 204(b)(3), 241(f), 242-43, providing employee training, see §§ 241(f), 249-51, and allocating
funds, see §§ 221-28, 311.
The Act does state that most of its actions are provided to assist all government employees
working in juvenile justice, including federal workers. See, e.g., § 241(f). Beyond existing federal
prosecutors and district court judges, however, JJDPA never creates new positions for employees
working directly with juvenile offenders. See supranote 192 and accompanying text. Further, the
federal government has not subsequently established any such opportunities for organized,
direct involvement on the federal level. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5711 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
195. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5286 (describing the deficiencies that the federal legislation needed to address as the lack of central
responsibility and leadership, accepted national priorities, bureaucratic accountability, and
definition of objectives and focus); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The "Child" Grows Up: The
Juvenile Justice System Enters Its Second Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 589, 593 (1999) (listing JJDPA's
seven general effects without noting the existence of any direct federal relationship with juveniles on the state level).
196. S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5283.
197. See id. at 4, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5286; see also United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Congress recognized that the federal court system is
at best ill equipped to meet the needs of juvenile offenders.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the presumption in favor of state jurisdiction was necessary to fulfill
JJDPA's purpose because this presumption channeled juvenile offenders into the arena providing direct social rehabilitation.1 98
D. The Effects of Subsequent Legislation
Despite the numerous revisions and amendments to JJDPA in
recent decades,' " these changes did not diminish the extent of juveniles' substantial interest in participating in state programs. Many
significant parts of JJDPA, in fact, remained the same. The definition
of "juvenile delinquency program," for instance, remained virtually
unchanged, indicating that Congress intended to continue to suppress
federal prosecutorial authority.' Similarly, federal agencies remain
committed to providing only indirect support of state juvenile justice
programs." Overall, most of the recent changes have had little effect
because they have neither renewed federal prosecutors' authority over
jurisdiction" nor created any direct relationships between juveniles
and the federal government.'
Other changes, by more clearly avoiding replication of state
benefits on the federal level, reveal the continued Vitality of the juveniles' statutory interest in participating in state systems. For example,
the declared purposes of the federal legislation include explicit statements directing the federal government to assist state and local juvenile justice programs in achieving policy goals even broader than those
initially envisioned. ' Conditions on federal funding now require more
specific and elaborate juvenile programs and provide additional opportunities for state innovation and initiatives.' In addition, newly created state advisory groups provide states with a means of influencing

198. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 5-6, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5287-88.
199. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-75.
200. See § 5603 (noting that subsequent amendments only made minor changes to § 5063(3)
defining 'juvenile delinquency program). For a discussion of how the inclusion of § 5032 certification as a vital part of the comprehensive federal scheme to improve state systems indicated
such congressional intent regarding the removal of prosecutorial authority, see the discussion
supraPart V.B regarding the facial characterization of § 5032 as merely affecting jurisdiction or
discretion.
201. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5614(b)(1)-(4); 5651(d); 5652; 5656(a)(1), (2), (8), (9); 5654(2)-(4);
5659-61.
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. 96-509, § 9, 94 Stat. 2750, 275355 (1980) (requiring an extensive annual report to Congress and the President and eliminating
the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 5602.
205. See §§ 5633, 5667c.
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the nature of federal assistance.' The National Institute for Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention also offers new suggestions for
improving existing programs and services directly helping juveniles.'
These changes clearly indicate the federal government's continuing
attempts to provide juvenile offenders committing state or federal
crimes with more effective state rehabilitative systems.'
The most significant legislative change occurred in the Crime
Control Act's addition of the third method of Attorney General certification.2" This change greatly expanded the instances in which federal
prosecutors could prevent juveniles from enjoying the benefits of participation in state systems. 10 Congress, however, never meant for this
change to alter the essential concepts of the 1974 legislation." Instead, Congress intended the Crime Control Act to remain faithful to
the spirit of the JJDPA. More importantly, the addition of the "substantial [flederal interest" basis for certification into the framework
establishing the presumption for state jurisdiction merely established
a new statutory criterion that could potentially justify denial of state
jurisdiction to an additional group of applicable juvenile offenders. 13
These adjustments to § 5032 did not change the ability to participate
in states systems back into an incidental effect of traditional prosecutorial discretion, so federal juvenile offenders still possess a vital
statutory interest in participating in state systems."4

206. See § 5651.
207. See § 5653.
208. See § 5662 (establishing special studies and reports of the juvenile justice system);
§ 5667f (providing for funding of boot camps available exclusively for the state systems).
209. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1320 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing
this change as injecting "a new element into the certification calculus).
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV. 1998).
211. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 386 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3526 ("[One]
essential concept of the 1974 Act... [is] that juvenile delinquency matters should generally be
handled by the States .... The Committee continues to endorse th[is] concepto.'); id. at 389,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529 (finding that most prosecutions of juveniles should
remain in the state courts).
212. See id. at 389.
213. See supra Part IV.A-B; see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 389 n.10, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529 n.10 ("Only if the criteria for retaining Federal jurisdiction over a
juvenile in the first instance ... are met, may there then be consideration of whether Federal
[criminal] prosecution... is appropriate.") (emphasis added).
214. See supra Part IV.A-B. The Attorney General's certification authority continued to
amount to an investigation of the circumstances in order to determine whether they triggered
the removal of state jurisdictions as the investigation now includes the characteristics of the
criminal offense already selected for the juvenile. See infra text accompanying note 257.
The notion that the juvenile justice systems across the country have lost their rehabilitative
goals deserves mention. Certainly, a punishing, "get tough" mentality has significantly affected,
and perhaps restructured, juvenile justice purposes and policies. See Shepherd, supra note 195,
at 593-99. However, the relevant rehabilitative purposes underlying JJDPA remain intact and
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V. DUE PROCESS: THE SOURCE FOR THE REQUIREMENT OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Courts considering claims for substantive review of Attorney
General certification decisions have largely ignored the historical
context surrounding § 5032's enactment." ' Consequently, they have
failed to consider the important due process concerns arising in certification cases." ' Since certification can strip federal juvenile offenders of
a significant statutory interest in participating in state systems, any
certification determination must satisfy constitutional procedural due
process requirements."7
The first step in procedural due process analysis requires a determination of whether the government has interfered with a liberty
or property interest."' The Constitution does not explicitly establish
an entitlement to most types of government benefits. 19 Once Congress
grants these statutory benefits, however, the federal government
cannot revoke them without abiding by the requirements of procedural due process.'
committed to funneling juveniles to the state systems, see supra note 211, which provide far
greater rehabilitation than available in the federal system, see Shepherd, supra note 46, at 46;
supra note 186.
215. See supraParts ]II-IV.
216. See supraParts EII-IV.
217. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966) ("It is clear beyond dispute that
the waiver of jurisdiction... determin[es] vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile ....
The Juvenile Court is vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction of the child. This jurisdiction confers special rights and immunities.') (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra note 222 and accompanying text; cf Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74
(1975) (analogous situation of public education).
This Note focuses on the due process concerns arising from the government's attempt to rescind its statutoryofferings. Any concerns regarding criminal due process are beyond the scope of
this Note. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 562 (contrasting the "requirements of a criminal trial" with the
requirements of general "due process'). Similarly, the notion that juveniles in the juvenile justice
system receive less due process than adults in the criminal justice system refers only to these
criminal due process concerns and is irrelevant to the topic of this Note. See id.; In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (referring specifically to issues affecting criminality like the entitlement of bail,
the indictment by grand jury, and trial by jury); id. at 17 (contrasting the adult's right to "liberty" to the juvenile's right to "custody').
218. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (describing the
two part test for due process questions).
219. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 481 (1977) (Burger, J., concurring) ('The decision to
provide any one of these [benefits] or not to provide them is not required by the ... Constitution.'); see also Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (referring to the lack of a "constitutional]i obligat[ion]" to
provide for public education); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
("Education, of course, is not.., afforded explicit protection under our... Constitution.').
220. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572-73 (showing that interests requiring due process protection
are normally "created and their dimensions defined by an independent source such as...
statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits') (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 573 ("Here, on the basis of state law, [these students] ... plainly had legitimate claims
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The JJDPA clearly establishes a significant interest to which
due process requirements must attach. Through the Act, Congress
granted juvenile offenders a statutory entitlement to participation in
rehabilitative state juvenile justice systems reinforced by federal
support. " Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the government's attempt to rescind statutory rights and benefits created
through the juvenile justice system must meet the requirements of
constitutional due process.' JJDPA's statutory entitlements satisfy
the first step in the Supreme Court's procedural due process analysis.
If a constitutionally protected interest exists, the Court's due
process analysis next focuses on procedural accuracy. 3 Initially,
courts must determine the statutory criteria necessary to trigger the
deprivation of the established interest." Then courts must consider
the sufficiency of existing procedures in accurately determining
whether such criteria apply.' If existing procedures are inadequate,
courts must then consider the level of additional procedures necessary
to ensure a sufficient degree of accuracy." In making these assess-

of entitlement to a public education.") (emphasis added); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
(1974).
221. See supra Part IV; see also Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57; cf. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573 (analogous
situation regarding entitlement to a public education).
222. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57, 562 ("[W]e do hold that the[se] [procedures] . . . must
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.') (emphasis added); supra note
217 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57); cf. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (analogous situation regarding
entitlement to public education); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (analogous situation regarding removal
of prisoners' good-time credits).
Though the Court in Kent only focused on statutory benefits that are common to federal and
state juvenile jurisdictions, see Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-67, other statutory benefits certainly accrue
through juvenile status which are unique to the state system, see discussion supra Part Ill.
Further, the Court soon described the "features of the juvenile system which... are of unique
benefit' in more depth to include "the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from
adults." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967) (emphasis added). Such "treatment" includes a statutory benefit provided for federal juvenile offenders through the state systems rather than
through the federal system. See discussion supra Part IV; see also supranotes 8, 186. The mere
existence of this statutory benefit establishes the need for due process, regardless of the weight
of the interest. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 575-76.
223. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460
("[Tihe second [step] examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient."); Goss, 419 U.S. at 577 ("Once it is determined that due process
applies, the question remains what process is due.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335-36 (identifying first the criteria allowing removal of disability benefits).
225. See id. at 337-47 (examining the adequacy of the procedures used to determine whether
the criteria needed to remove disability benefits was met); Goss, 419 U.S. at 577 (looking at the
"remain[ing]" question of "what process is due").
226. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64, 269-70 (1970) (deciding the extent of additional procedures required after finding current procedures inadequate). A court may also use an
assessment of the value of additional procedures to help determine the adequacy of current
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ments regarding both existing and potential procedures, courts must
balance the significance of the private interest at stake, and the risk of
its loss due to inadequate procedures, against the potential burden
upon the state if it implements heightened procedural protections.'
Here the Constitution requires only the level of procedural protection
necessary to ensure an accurate determinative process; it does require
accuracy in the outcome itself.'
Applying this analysis to JJDPA, courts must assess the procedural accuracy of the process through which the federal government
deprives juvenile offenders of the opportunity to participate in state
justice systems. Prior to the certification decision, JJDPA explicitly
mentions only an initial investigation by the Attorney General.' Until
passage of the Crime Control Act, these investigations appeared to
afford a sufficient degree of procedural accuracy in determining
whether a particular juvenile offender met the statutory criteria justifying certification.' A simple investigation could quickly and accurately determine whether a particular state lacked or refused jurisdiction, or whether the state lacked sufficient programs or services."'
Though the Attorney General could certainly err in making these
determinations (e.g., by failing to account for certain state programs,)
the investigation itself would satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement
of adequate procedures. The objective nature of the Attorney General's

procedures. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 337-47 (finding that the lack of value in alternative
procedures justified the existing procedures).
227. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347-49.
228. See id. at 344 ("[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in
the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.').
229. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
230. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 93-415,
§ 502, 88 Stat. 1109, 1134 (1974).
231. See id. One could argue that the only criterion necessary for overcoming the presumption for state jurisdiction is the certification decision itself. Cf. United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d
519, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1998) (characterizing the statutory text in this manner by stating that "the
only jurisdictional requirement is that the Attorney General certify that such an interest exists).
The Attorney General's certification of the existence of certain criteria, e.g., the existence of a
substantial federal interest, would then be the only requirement for invoking federal jurisdiction.
See id. Thus, the due process required to determine this criterion-the existence of a certification-would not need heightened procedural safeguards. This argument assumes, however, that
the statutory interests in JJDPA were created subject to the investigation of the Attorney
General. Such an argument, though initially successful before the Supreme Court, see, e.g.,
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974), was expressly rejected by the Court in Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1980). The Court in Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
541, determined that government-created interests cannot exist subject to inaccurate procedures
because the requirements of due process flow from the Constitution rather than the actual
legislation. Instead of allowing the government to create such defective interests, the Supreme
Court held that any statutory right required the protections of constitutionaldue process. See id.
Thus, such an argument fails in the face of Loudermill.
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investigations obviated the need for additional procedures because the
low risk of an erroneous deprivation rendered additional procedural
safeguards of little value."
The Crime Control Act's introduction of a third basis for certification-crimes of violence involving a substantial federal interestraises more serious due process concerns. In contrast to the objective
determination of whether certain tangible conditions exist within a
particular state jurisdiction,"a the Attorney General's determinations
regarding "violent' crimes and "substantial" federal interests necessarily focus on vague, subjective criteria." ' The substantial risk of
error in the evaluation of these indeterminate factors by a single
prosecutorial entity, especially with the need to take into account
many different factors in combination makes it difficult to achieve
procedural accuracy with simply a prosecutorial investigation.235 Considering the significance of the private interests involved,' the high
risk of inaccuracy introduced by the new criteria for certification renders JJDPA's current level of procedural protection constitutionally
inadequate. 7 Without additional procedural safeguards, the statute in

232. See JJDPA § 502; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 343 ("An additional factor... is the
fairness and reliability of the existing... procedures, and the probable value... of additional
safeguards.').
233. See supranotes 229-32 and accompanying text.
234. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. While the vagueness surrounding the subjective search for a "substantial federal interest' is clear, see, e.g., Jarrett,133 F.3d at 538-39 (realizing that the Attorney
General's assessment is entirely subjective), the determination of violence becomes deceptively
more difficult with certain crimes, see United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 618-20 (8th
Cir. 1991) (evaluating the presence of "violence" in a criminal conspiracy charge).
235. See United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 307 (5th Cir. 1997) (listing some of
the factors that the Attorney General must consider such as the gravity of the Federal offense
compared to the state offense, the relationship of the offense to other Federal offenses committed
by the accused, and the likelihood of effective investigation and prosecution by the possible
jurisdictions) (citing S. REP. No. 97-307, at 5 (1981)).
236. See supranote 8.
237. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57, 561-62; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335; e. id. at 337-40 (finding more accurate procedures than those available in § 5032 in deter.
mining the criteria for the social security benefits).
Many courts have found adult transfers in various juvenile systems across the United States,
which would similarly remove these statutorily created interest, to be constitutional, despite a
conspicuous lack of procedures determining any accuracy. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 343
A.2d 48, 49-50 (D.C. 1975). However, these decisions do not affect the requirement of due process
regarding the certification of § 5032. These courts uphold adult transfer proceedings based on
statutes with far less vague criteria. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1336-37 &
n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (regarding statute with clear automatic transfers); United States ex rel.
Pedrosa v. Sielaf, 434 F. Supp. 493, 496-97 & n.7 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (finding due process problems in
vague state statute and listing contrasting cases evaluating vague and clear statutes). JJDPA's
certification, in contrast, turns on more vague characteristics of the crime charged by the prosecutor rather than on the simple existence of a charge itself. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032.

2000]

AVAILABILITY OFJUDICL4L REVIEW

1347

its current form does not ensure a sufficient degree of procedural
accuracy. 8
Upon recognizing procedural inadequacy, courts determine the
need for additional procedural safeguards by balancing the substantial
risk of "grievous loss" against the potential burden of additional procedures on the federal government. 9 The "grievous loss" juveniles
would suffer in losing these state programs and services that assist
their social reintegration-thereby potentially ensuring a life of criminal behavior and isolating social stigmatization--justifies some

Some courts have identified these "waiver" proceedings as coming in three flavors: legislative
offense exclusion; judicial; and prosecutorial. See State v. Butler, 977 P.2d 1000, 1005 (Mont.
1999). Legislative offense exclusion waivers, where the legislature omits certain categories of
offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, see id., implicate no procedural due process concern in
regards to the class of offenders statutorily excluded from receiving the benefits of the juvenile
system, see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975) (finding that due process requirements attach when "statutes or rules [are] entitling the citizen to certain benefits'). Judicial
waiver proceedings, which "provide that a judge may transfer a juvenile to adult court, at the
judge's discretion, if certain statutory criteria are met," State ex rel. A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 817 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1994), clearly require procedural due process. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57, 561-62.
Finally, under prosecutorial waivers, a statute provides for concurrent jurisdiction between
juvenile and criminal courts, leaving the prosecutors with the discretion to determine the
applicable forum. See Butler, 977 P.2d at 1005. Regardless of whether this prosecutorial discretion requires due process, § 5032 is not analogous to these waivers. Rather than provide concurrent jurisdiction, § 5032 instead provides exclusive jurisdiction in the state forum. See discussion
supra Part IV. B. Also, rather than provide the prosecutor discretionary control over forum
selection, Congress blocked the Attorney General's discretion and conditioned the removal of this
exclusive jurisdiction on the existence of certain conditions. See generally discussion supra Part

IV.
Further, though some courts focus on the "non-adjudicatory" nature of the adult transfer process, this distinction is irrelevant to the certification. See, e.g., State v. Flying Horse, 455 N.W.2d
605, 608 (S.D. 1990) ('The salient feature of the transfer proceeding is that it is not adjudicatory
in nature.'!). The non-adjudication distinction refers to the adult transfer's non-adjudication of
the criminal charges at hand, thereby implicating criminal due process concerns. See, e.g., id. In
contrast, the § 5032 certification implicates an adjudication of a statutory right, see Kent, 383
U.S. at 556-57, 561-62; supra Part IV, and thus requires due procedures, Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335; see also, e.g., Corder v. Rogerson, 192 F.3d 1165, 1168 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding criminal due
process concerns like the "opportunity to confront and cross-examine" irrelevant to the concerns
presented in Kent). Due process would still be required in any adjudication that threatens the
statutory benefit of the juvenile justice system and does not affect criminal liability, i.e., "nonadjudicatory" proceedings, like the certification process of § 5032. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335;
Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57, 561-62. Though § 5032 may not adjudicate criminal liability, it does
determine the availability of a statutory benefit. See supraPart IV.
238. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57, 561-62; see also supra note 222 (discussing the relevance of
the Court's analysis in Kent).
239. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 'The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he [or she] may be condemned to suffer
grievous loss." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). For a brief discussion regarding the loss juveniles would suffer, see supra note
8.
240. See supra notes 8, 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Progressives' goals for
juvenile justice); see also Kent, 383 U.S. at 556 (finding "clear beyond dispute" that the proce-
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degree of objective review by district courts." Furthermore, such
review would not result in either administrative or financial burdens.
Even without independent, district court review, juvenile offenders
already face proceedings in federal courts if a prosecutor issues a
§ 5032 certification. 2 Adding a hearing on the certification issue at
the outset of the already scheduled proceedings does not seem overly
burdensome on the federal courts. Such proceeding could be tailored to
minimize the burden on the federal government by merely inquiring
into the federal prosecutor's decision and providing some opportunity
for rebuttal by the juvenile." Since some of the determining factors
involved do relate to issues normally decided by federal prosecutors,"
the district court judge could give some deference to prosecutorial
determinations on these issues. Considering the importance of the
private interests at stake, as well as the high risk of error inherent in
certification decisions, the adoption of some degree of objective judicial
review would not place an undue burden on the government. "'
In the absence of meaningful procedural opportunities to ensure an accurate determination,"6 circuit courts considering the issue
should read judicial review into § 5032 in order to rescue the statute
from unconstitutionality." Judicial review would immediately im-

dures determining the status of benefits provided by the juvenile justice system were "a critically
important action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile") (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
241. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 560-62; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, 579 (1975).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
243. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 ("All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored ...to 'the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard' to ensure that they
are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.") (citation omitted and emphasis
added) (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69). The determination of the relevant factors does not
require evidence or witnesses beyond information about the state jurisdiction and the relevant
crimes involved. See supranote 234 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting "substantial federal interest" is a term of art to executive officials).
245. Besides the brief discussion above regarding the feasibility of tailoring review proceedings to minimize the burden on the government, the nature and scope of the procedures actually
required is beyond the scope of this Note. Resolving this question would require determining,
among other things, the precise issues to be analyzed, the appropriate degree of deference to
federal prosecutors, the appropriate party upon whom to place the burden of proof, and the
.
standard required to determine this burden.
246. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (expressing the need to ensure those facing loss "a
meaningful opportunity to present their case').
247. The courts' ability to read judicial review into statutory silence is well recognized. See
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 436-37 (1995) (reading judicial review into
Congress's "silence"); see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667,
670-71 (1986) ("We begin with the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of
administrative action."). If such an interpretation clears the statute's "serious doubt of constitutionality[,]" a court must follow the "cardinal principle" of accepting "a construction of the statute
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prove procedural accuracy since the judiciary could ensure that the
prosecutor has more than far-fetched theories regarding the alleged
substantial federal interests or other criteria justifying the third
method of certification. 8 A review hearing would also provide juvenile
offenders a valuable opportunity to voice their opposition to decisions
denying them participation in state systems. 9 Since judicial review
would rectify JJDPA's problems with constitutional due process, this
judicial
response is
required
to
sustain
the
statute's
constitutionality.' °
The analysis employed by the majority of circuits appears persuasive only if one ignores the statute's historical context.21 Interpreting JJDPA's language literally, the majority characterizes the
statute as merely addressing jurisdictional concerns.' Without viewing the historical background, § 5032 certification indeed seems akin
to prosecutors' traditional power to impose federal jurisdiction over
any offender simply by charging that person with a federal crime.'
Under this view, any certification decision should fall under the prosecutor's exclusive discretion, thereby precluding judicial review.' From
the majority perspective, forbidding review of certification decisions
appears entirely consistent with the traditional relationship between
the judiciary and federal prosecutorsY'
Unfortunately, this position overlooks the impact of the prosecutor's decision on juvenile offenders. With the introduction of a statutorily recognized interest in the applicability of state jurisdiction,
Congress transformed the prosecutor's relationship with juveniles.
Certification essentially amounts to an administrative assessment of
whether a statutory interest is available to certain federal juvenile
offenders.' Thus, instead of acting merely as a traditional prosecutor
who selects the criminal charges, the Attorney General under § 5032
takes on the role of an administrative agent authorized to investigate
the characteristicsof the already selected offense in order to determine

. .by which the question may be avoided." See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 433
(1956).
248. At the very least, the judge can ensure that the federal prosecutor has contemplated the
existence of some federal interest.
249. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
250. See Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 433.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 302-07 (5th Cir. 1997).
252. See, e.g., id. at 305.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1998).
254. See, e.g., Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305 ("[A] 'substantial federal interest' inquiry is
integral to every decision whether to prosecute.') (footnote omitted).
255. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
256. See discussion supraPart V.B.
*
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the availability of a constitutionally protected interest.'l The flaw in
the majority's analysis lies in its failure to appreciate the historical
transformation in the role of federal prosecutors." A more careful
analysis suggests that certification decisions, as products of a new and
different role for federal prosecutors, do not fall within the realm of
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion as the majority asserts.'
Based upon the majority's characterization of JJDPA, arguments that Congress did not intend to authorize judicial review of
certification decisions appear persuasive. Legislative intent becomes
irrelevant, however, when a statute suffers from a lack of constitutional due process.' If doing so will rescue a statute from unconstitutionality, courts should adopt even a strained interpretation of the
legislation without considering congressional intent."1 In the case of §
5032 certifications, therefore, courts should read judicial review into
the statute's silence in order to satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process. 6 2 Despite allegations of contrary congressional intent,
courts should interpret the statute in a way that saves it from unconstitutionality.'
The lone minority circuit appears close to just such an interpretation.' In Juvenile Male #1, the Fourth Circuit implied that the
certification determination was similar to other executive decisions
falling outside of the realm of prosecutorial discretion." The court also
closely scrutinized the historical context of the statute, finding that
Congress enacted JJDPA primarily to provide rehabilitative state
assistance for juvenile offenders.' Although the court may have implicitly recognized that the certification decision resembles other
administrative decisions not exempt from judicial review, 7 it neither
stated such a finding nor engaged in an evaluation of constitutional
due process requirements.' Instead, the court based its holding on a

257. See discussion supraPart IV.A-B; supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
258. See discussion supraPart TV.B.; see also supratext accompanying notes 213.
259. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-41 (1976); see also Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966).
260. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 433 (1956).
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (4th Cir. 1996).
265. Id. (noting that "executive determinations" are generally subject to review and comparing the certification to the reviewable scope-of-employment certification of the Westfall Act).
266. See id. at 1320 & n.9.
267. See id. at 1319-20 & n.9.
268. See id. at 1319-20.
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judicial canon emphasizing legislative intent." Such presumptions
regarding the intent of Congress, however, are irrelevant when the
Constitution requires judicial review." Despite its appropriate inquiry
into historical context, and although the spirit of the court's language
leans towards the correct analysis, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize the federal prosecutor's new role and to assess the requirements
of due process.

VI. CONCLUSION

If minors do not "shed their constitutional rights" to due process "at the schoolhouse door,"27 ' they certainly do not lose these rights
when entering the justice system.Y In passing JJDPA, Congress allowed automatic participation by federal juvenile offenders in rehabilitative state programs supplemented with federal assistance. Specifically, § 5032 reflected a legislative policy designed to ensure that the
benefits of state juvenile justice systems reached as many federal
juvenile offenders as possible. After the Act, juvenile offenders could
legitimately expect to participate in state rehabilitative programs and
services standardized and supported by the federal government. Under modern constitutional jurisprudence, such statutorily created
entitlements may be revoked only through procedures satisfying the
requirements of due process.
Unfortunately, most circuit courts neglected the historical context surrounding passage of JJDPA. Consequently, these circuits
considered only the superficial aspects of the statute, characterizing

269. See id. In fact, the Lamagno decision does not reveal the presumption that the Fourth
Circuit in Juvenile Male is apparently seeking. The Supreme Court stated that a presumption for
judicial review of executive action existed when the administrative judgment was determinative
of a controversy. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 424 (1995). The presumption
sought by the Fourth Circuit comes from a line of cases cited in Lamagno. See id. (citing, inter
alia, Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)). Such a
presumption remains irrelevant since the Constitution requires judicial review of the certification of a substantial federal interest. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 433 (1956).
However, since the prosecutor here acts like other executive entities subject to "the strong
presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action," Bowen, 476 U.S. at
670, the presumption of the judicial canon could be relevant for juveniles seeking review of the
other methods of certification not affected by constitutional due process concerns, see id. at 67071. These possibilities, however, were not entertained by the Fourth Circuit, Juvenile Male #1,
86 F.3d at 1317-21, and are beyond the scope of this Note.
270. See Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 433.
271. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
272. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
13 (1967) ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.!).
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federal prosecutors' relationship with juveniles as virtually unchanged
from its traditional status. Ignoring the effects of certification decisions, with their potential to strip juvenile offenders of the statutory
interests established in JJDPA, the majority of circuits currently
allow federal prosecutors to make certification determinations with
final, unreviewable discretion.
Section 5032 certification decisions based on the existence of a
substantial federal interest require judicial review. Under established
constitutional precedent, due process demands sufficient procedural
accuracy. 3 Since a certain category of juvenile offenders could potentially lose a constitutionally protected interest, all juveniles are entitled to due process in the determination of whether they fall into this
category. In the absence of additional procedural safeguards, courts
must read judicial review into JJDPA to save the statute from unconstitutionality.
Though the majority of juvenile offenders do not fall within the
reach of § 5032, a considerable number of juveniles do face certification decisions each year. Meanwhile, society is continuously bombarded with images of juveniles committing violent crimes with national repercussions."' In response, federal criminal legislation
annually increases in scope.7 Thus, an ever-increasing number of
juveniles face potential unconstitutional denial of the significant rehabilitative benefits provided under JJDPA. Despite the rehabilitative
focus of the juvenile justice system, future juvenile offenders may lose
an important opportunity to reform in state systems. Without the
assistance of state programs and services, these juvenile offenders face
a bleak future of persistent criminality.
An examination of any statute should not ignore the historical
context in which it was passed. Unfortunately, the purposes and underlying effects of JJDPA have repeatedly received inadequate judicial
consideration. Courts have also misinterpreted § 5032's place in the
span of federal juvenile delinquency legislation throughout the twentieth century. The recent jurisprudence regarding § 5032 certification
serves as a reminder of the importance of historical context in statu-

273. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-74.
274. Though "[flew cases involving juvenile delinquents are processed in [federal courts]" on
a yearly basis, over 1,100 juveniles saw their delinquency proceedings terminate in federal court
over a seven year period. See John Scalia, Juvenile Delinquent in the Federal Criminal System
(last modified Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/jdfcjs.txt>. The annual
number of such potential cases is also considerable. For example, close to 500 juveniles were
referred to federal prosecutors for investigation in 1995. See id.
275. See Feld, supranote 1, at 327.
276. See id.
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tory interpretation. Regardless of the buildup of legislation and jurisprudence over the decades, a critical constitutional protection like due
process should never fade into judicial oblivion.
Robert B. Mahini"
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